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Iraqi archaeologists and Assyriologists 
are desperate for communication and 
collaboration and intellectual chal-
lenge. Almost every colleague I meet in 
Iraq is keen to set up research partner-
ships and training programmes. Yet they 
are working in a vacuum, mostly isolat-
ed and unheard in their own country 
and beyond. There is little public dis-
course on local history and archaeology, 
and little Iraqi government understand-
ing of the value of these matters in civic 
and cultural life. In this paper I explore 
how this situation came to be; why it is 
a matter of concern; and what, if any-
thing, we as western academic histor-
ians, should try to do to about it. In the 
latter sections of the paper in particular, 
I do not try to be comprehensive but 
draw upon my own experiences and ob-
servations, in relation to the UK context 
in which I work. My aim is not simply to 
describe but to stimulate discussion, re-
sponse and action.
Keywords: Iraq; Cultural Heritage; 
Archaeology; Assyriology; Politics; Col-
laboration
Let us begin with a thought experiment.1 
Try to imagine that the biggest, best 
funded research centres on ancient Brit-
ish monuments such as Stonehenge and 
Avebury are all in East Asia. Some British 
universities carry out some basic archae-
ological exploration of smaller prehistor-
ic earthworks, such as the Rollright 
Stones, but publish little of their work. 
The British public has a basic understand-
ing of the cultural importance of stone 
circles—they vaguely remember studying 
them at primary school—and like to visit 
them for family picnics and school trips. 
In order to keep up with the latest discov-
eries and theoretical developments, how-
ever, one needs to read the academic lit-
erature in Chinese, Japanese and Korean. 
All online resources, as well as most pop-
ular histories, television programmes, 
etc., are in these languages too, and their 
authors show little interest in getting 
them translated into English—which, by 
and large they do not speak very well. In-
deed, most of the best researchers hard-
ly ever set foot in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and rely instead on decades-old 
archaeological surveys, satellite imagery 
and large collections of artefacts, whether 
excavated or purchased, now housed in 
their own countries. 
This scenario may seem very far-fetched. 
But it approximates the current state of an-
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cient Babylonian history and archaeology 
in southern Iraq. In October 2012 I gave 
two lectures on Old Babylonian math-
ematics, literature and scribal schooling in 
the ancient city of Nippur in southern Iraq. 
This was nothing unusual in itself, for these 
are subjects I have researched, on and off, 
over many years. What marked the occa-
sion was not so much the content of my 
lectures but the context. For the first time 
since the 2003 Iraq War I was back in 
southern Iraq itself, around 20 miles from 
the site of Nippur, which I had first visited 
just a day or two earlier. Initially, I was 
struck only by the oddity of the fact that I 
had become expert on the place (or at 
least some aspects of it) over a decade be-
fore actually setting foot in it. But as my 
visit wore on I became increasingly aware 
of, and uncomfortable about, how little my 
audiences knew about what was, in effect, 
local history. Here I was, giving lectures in 
English to Iraqi academics (mostly math-
ematicians) and university students (most-
ly archaeologists) about their own cultural 
and intellectual heritage. And in order to 
do so, I had to dramatically simplify the 
story that I was telling, even compared to 
when I talk to school children or amateur 
history groups in the UK. It was not just a 
matter of language—my words were being 
translated into Arabic sentence by sen-
tence by a kind colleague—but of concep-
tual content too. Then, when people asked 
me for further reading, I could give them 
one recent article of mine that has been 
translated into Arabic but almost every-
thing else required a good grasp of aca-
demic English, French or German, a high-
speed internet connection, and/or the 
means to buy or borrow expensive, low-
print-run books. With some notable ex-
ceptions—for instance the journal Sumer, 
and the work of University of Baghdad 
archaeologist Abdulillah Fadhil and his 
students—there is little local academic 
publication of ancient Iraqi history and 
archaeology, whether for researchers, stu-
dents or the interested general public. The 
more I thought about the situation, the 
more ethically problematic it seemed. 
It is not that there is no local interest in an-
cient history. My invitation to Diwaniyah 
had come from Dr Ahmed Zainy, a Berlin-
trained mathematician at the Women’s 
College of the University of Baghdad, who 
had been using my work in his undergradu-
ate teaching. Some of the most acute and 
appreciative reactions to my most recent 
book have come from within the Iraqi 
mathematical community. And my talks 
generated a lot of animated discussion 
amongst my Iraqi friends and colleagues. 
French-educated Basra mathematician Dr 
Hanna Ali Munther, for instance, intro-
duced me to a colleague as the person 
who had taught her most about the his-
tory of her own country. 
Likewise, Iraqi archaeologists and Assyri-
ologists are desperate for communication 
and collaboration and intellectual chal-
lenge. Almost every colleague I met in Iraq 
was keen to set up research partnerships 
and training programmes. Yet, despite 
multiple international initiatives to engage 
significantly and intensively with Iraqi cul-
tural heritage professionals (Stone and 
Baj jaly), many feel they are working in a 
vacuum, mostly isolated and unheard in 
their own country and beyond. There is 
little public discourse on local history and 
archaeology, and little Iraqi government 
understanding of the value of these mat-
ters in civic and cultural life. In this paper I 
explore how this situation came to be; why 
it is a matter of concern; and what, if any-
thing, we as western academic historians, 
should try to do to about it. In the latter 
sections of the paper in particular, I do not 
try to be comprehensive but draw upon 
my own experiences and observations, in 
relation to the UK context in which I work. 
My aim is not simply to describe but to 
stimulate discussion, response and action.
Building a Country, Constructing a Past
To understand the state of ancient history 
and archaeology in Iraq today we need to 
go back at least a hundred years. For con-
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venience I shall divide the past century 
into four distinct phases.
1. Wartime and Mandate Iraq
The ancient history and archaeology of 
Mandate Iraq were initially constructed as 
a purely British enterprise, while its Islam-
ic heritage was deliberately underplayed. 
The tone had already been set during the 
British occupation of Mesopotamia dur-
ing World War I (Bernhardsson 57-92). 
Many archaeologists were recruited into 
the Arab Bureau, due to their expert local 
knowledge: most famously Leonard 
Woolley and T.E. Lawrence, who were 
then excavating together at Carchemish, 
and of course Gertrude Bell. Antiquity 
thus gained an unexpected prominence 
in Britain’s conduct of the war. Both the 
British Museum and the Victoria and Al-
bert Museum lobbied to impound the 
finds from pre-war German excavations as 
war booty. The British Museum even se-
conded two Assyriologists to Mesopota-
mian forces in order to carry out excava-
tions at ancient Sumerian cities in the 
occupied southern marshes.
When the new Kingdom of Iraq was cre-
ated under British Mandate in 1920 it was 
conceptualised as an essentially Arab en-
tity, and a Sunni Arab one at that (Sluglett; 
Dodge). In this view, pre-Islamic, pre-
Arab antiquity was irrelevant to state for-
mation, whose citizens for the most part 
were not, in any case, supposed to be 
educated or intelligent enough to appre-
ciate its value. Baghdad had had a col-
lege of law since 1908, and engineering 
and teacher training colleges were set up 
in 1923, but as late as 1935 the American-
led Monroe Commission reported that 
Iraq was not ready for the introduction of 
university education, as a surplus of high-
ly educated young men with no suitable 
jobs to go to would undoubtedly lead to 
political unrest (Lukitz 115–17). Iraq did not 
establish a state higher education system 
until the mid-1950s.
British archaeology benefited greatly from 
the Mandate (Bernhardsson 130-64; 
Goode, Negotiating 185–202). Gertrude 
Bell, as Honorary Director of Antiquities, 
set up a legislative and administrative 
framework almost single-handedly, in the 
face of fierce opposition from more inde-
pendence-minded Iraqi politicians. Two 
large-scale British-American expeditions 
ran at Ur and Kish until shortly after 1932, 
when the occupation officially ended. Oth-
er American, German and French teams 
were allowed to work in the country too. 
Almost all of the sites they explored were 
southern cities of the third and early sec-
ond millennia BC, namely from the first 
half of ancient Babylonian history. Iraqi in-
volvement was notably absent. The la-
bourers and support staff were of course 
local men. But no effort was made, any-
where by anyone, to train promising 
young Iraqis in how to uncover the ancient 
past of their country. Indeed there was no 
real means to identify recruits and instruct 
them in academic work. 
Likewise, the nascent Iraq Museum was 
not initially conceived as an institution 
made for or by Iraqis. It had no ambitions 
to bolster the current political messages 
of pan-Arab unity and no resources to do 
so, being furnished exclusively with finds 
from European and North American expe-
ditions, which had no interest in the great 
Islamic empires of the past. Nor did it aim, 
as many western museums did, to display 
imperial trophies or chart a progressivist 
narrative of mankind’s ascent from primi-
tive savagery. It was simply a collection of 
stuff from excavations, curated haphazard-
ly by Bell and increasingly reflecting her 
withdrawal from current political life.
2. Independent Iraq
When Britain formally withdrew in 1932 
the former Education Minister Sati‘ al-Hus-
ri became the first Iraqi Director General 
of Antiquities (Bernhardsson 164–210; 
Goode, Negotiating 203–28). He revised 
Bell’s antiquities laws in Iraq’s favour, which 
had the effect of discouraging foreign ex-
peditions as it was now harder to bring 
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finds back home to display to sponsors 
and publics. Meanwhile, the first Iraqi PhD 
students were sent to study archaeology 
in Chicago. Taha Baqir and Fuad Safar 
would go on to become leading figures in 
the field. The first Iraqi-led excavations 
were carried out at the classical Islamic 
sites of Samarra and Wasit, and Abbasid 
monuments were restored. Planning be-
gan for a much larger and more accessible 
Iraq Museum.
In schools, meanwhile, history teaching 
had already been centred on pan-Arabism 
since the early 1920s (Simon). Post-inde-
pendence, the curriculum became ever 
more explicitly nationalist and militaristic, 
focusing on thirty to forty Arab, mostly 
Sunni Muslim, ‘heroes’ of the past as mor-
al role models for Iraqi youth. There was 
little room in this version of history for the 
ancient, pre-Arabic past of the region, let 
alone for global perspectives.
3. Back to Antiquity in Baathist Iraq
Given that Baathism was an explicitly pan-
Arabist political movement, one might 
have expected the trends of the post-
Mandate years to continue and intensify. 
However, over the period 1968-2003 Iraq 
increasingly presented itself as a modern-
ist—and, in the early decades, secular—
state built on a deep antiquity (Baram; Da-
vis, Memories; “The Museum”). The 
Ministry of Information produced glossy 
English-language publications with titles 
such as Mesopotamia Yesterday, Iraq To-
day. The state exerted centralised control 
over the past in various ways: through 
school history curricula, through the State 
Board of Antiquities and Heritage, and 
through public images of the regime, of 
Saddam in particular. Collectively they 
presented Iraq and its leader as the nat-
ural, inevitable successor of millennia of 
militarised dominance over the region, 
headed by powerful men such as Hammu-
rabi, Nebuchadnezzar and Salah al-Din 
(Goode, “Archaeology”; al-Gailani Werr). 
The Mongol, Ottoman, and Mandate peri-
ods of ‘foreign occupation’ were deliber-
ately downplayed.
The new Iraq Museum was opened in 
1966, telling a unified narrative of the 
country’s past, from neolithic hunter-gath-
erers in the north to the glories of Abbasid 
Baghdad. Regional museums were sent 
highly uniform mini-collections of arte-
facts to display so that the same story 
could be told from Dohuk in the moun-
tainous north to Basra in the Gulf marshes. 
In this way local histories, regional identi-
ties, and other challenges to the authority 
and unity of the state were minimised: the 
diversity of Iraq’s long past was hom-
ogenised into a single, unifying story 
which all could identify with but to which 
no constituency or community could claim 
privileged access.
At the same time, Iraqi modernism en-
couraged other countries to set up re-
search institutions in Baghdad, especial-
ly those that focused on the regime’s 
preferred aspects of ancient and pre-
modern history. The oil boom of the 
1970s and 1980s brought huge budget 
increases to the State Boarch of Antiqui-
ties and Heritage and a renewed empha-
sis on pre-Islamic sites with complex in-
ternational archaeological rescue 
projects prior to major damming works. 
Archaeological excavation continued 
throughout the Iran-Iraq War of the 
1980s, while nationalist rhetoric increas-
ingly focused on the ancient past in or-
der to downplay commonalities with 
Iraq’s Shia neighbours. Very much in that 
vein, late in the decade the heavily re-
stored archaeological site of Babylon be-
gan to host an annual international festi-
val of Iraqi arts and culture (Tracy). 
4. Sanctions and Beyond
Foreign missions withdrew from Iraq in the 
run-up to the invasion of Kuwait on 2 Au-
gust 1990, as the state started to take ‘hu-
man shields’ as hostages. Just four days 
later the United Nations enforced an inter-
national embargo on financial and trade 
relations with Iraq. That month, in retro-
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spect, marked the beginning of long de-
cades of isolation for the Iraqi academic 
community. Many provincial museums 
were looted in the post-war Shia uprisings 
of spring 1991 and then stayed perman-
ently shut. The Babylon Festival somehow 
staggered on but the Iraq Museum too 
closed to public, re-opening only briefly 
for special occasions such as Saddam’s 
birthday in 2000. Large-scale looting of 
archaeological sites was impossible to 
control, as the State Board’s budget was 
now dramatically reduced. Illicitly excavat-
ed artefacts, especially cuneiform tablets, 
flooded international antiquities markets.
Museum and university staff suffered like 
the rest of the population with the drastic 
impact that international sanctions had on 
everyday life. University teachers could 
not live on their salaries alone; students, if 
they could afford to study, chose more po-
tentially lucrative subjects. Heritage pro-
fessionals came under increasing surveil-
lance and increasing pressure to support 
the party line. Contact with the outside 
world became virtually impossible, except 
on tightly controlled state visits to confer-
ences or, latterly, monitored and censored 
emails. New publications, data, method-
ologies, and technologies—and these 
were substantial in the 1990s—all passed 
them by. This loss of contact, in other 
words, led to many other losses: of knowl-
edge and expertise; of funding and pres-
tige; of professionalism and control. As we 
shall see, it has been hard to regain these 
vital but often intangible assets now that 
circumstances are different.
The Current State Context
These, then, are the complex roots of 
Iraq’s often unhappy relationship with its 
ancient past. For a century already, some 
have seen its pre-Arab, pre-Islamic an-
tiquity as irrelevant to its present and fu-
ture, while for others—particularly 
Baathists—modernity can only be con-
structed out of antiquity, thereby deeply 
tainting that antiquity for the rest. What 
hope, then, for Sumer, Babylonia, and As-
syria in the twenty-first century? Does Iraq 
currently have the capacity to engage with 
its ancient precursors? What is gained by 
doing so and what is otherwise lost?
As I finish writing this piece, votes are be-
ing counted after the national elections of 
30 April 2014. It is currently impossible to 
predict what the immediate future holds 
after a year of increasing political corrup-
tion and violence, exacerbated by pres-
sures from war-torn Syria and UN-sanc-
tioned Iran. It is not all political doom and 
gloom, however. Provincial elections are 
widely acknowledged as successful, with 
a sophisticated combination of party lists 
and personal votes allowing people to re-
ward locally successful, honest and popu-
lar politicians whatever their political 
stripe (Haddad). Similarly, on the face of it, 
Iraq has never been in better economic 
shape, according to recent reports from 
the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. There is potentially plenty 
of state money available to support re-
search and education into the country’s 
past, assuming that there is the political 
willingness and institutional infrastructure 
to do so.
However, the think-tank Chatham House 
(Iraq Ten Years On) and the charity War 
Child (“Mission Unaccomplished”) last 
year drew attention to Iraq’s major under-
lying structural problems. It is the young-
est sector of the population who are feel-
ing the worst effects of the post-war 
period. In a country with a population of 
33 million, 18.5 million—56%—are under 
twenty-five, 12.2 million—37%—under fif-
teen. Less than half of 12-17 year-olds are 
in school and drop-out rates in both pri-
mary and secondary school are nearly 10% 
a year. Although 9% of the country’s bud-
get goes on education, 90% of that goes 
on salary costs, leaving very little for infra-
structure. As a result over 40% of schools 
are in need of repair or reconstruction, 
and a further five thousand schools need 
to be built—and teachers trained for them—
if Iraq is to meet the educational needs of 
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its fast-growing youth population. The na-
tional literacy rate stands at just 78% com-
pared to a world average of 85%, the 
same as Tunisia and Tanzania and signifi-
cantly better than India or Egypt at 72%, 
but worse than Iran, (pre-war) Syria, and 
South Africa. 
The school system and state curriculum 
have remained largely unaltered since the 
war, except for a thorough de-Baathifica-
tion of its contents. According to a 2011 
UNESCO report (UNESCO, “World Data”), 
children study history for just two 40- or 
45-minute periods a week, in years 5-6 of 
primary school (ages 10–11) and years 1–3 
of secondary school (ages 12–14). Thereaf-
ter secondary schooling splits into two 
streams, ‘literary’ and ‘scientific’, for ages 
15-17. The history quotient goes up to 
three periods a week for ‘literary’ students 
but disappears entirely for ‘scientific’ ones. 
Ancient history is taught only at primary 
school. The schools themselves are 
drastic ally under-resourced and the teach-
ers under-trained. UNESCO’s education 
programme in Iraq focuses on improving 
mathematics, science and technology pro-
vision, and the promotion of civic values. 
The word ‘history’ does not feature at all 
on the Education Areas of Action section 
of UNESCO Iraq’s website, despite the fact 
that another high-profile theme of its in-
country work is Culture. On that part of its 
website UNESCO Iraq states that “safe-
guarding cultural heritage and rehabilitat-
ing cultural institutions are essential ele-
ments for national reconciliation and 
socio-economic development”. But that 
imperative does not seem to extend to 
equipping civil society with the means to 
appreciate and take advantage of such ini-
tiatives—only making provision for tourists. 
My worry is that UNESCO is unwittingly 
replicating the cultural conditions of Man-
date Iraq, when ancient history was solely 
for Europeans. 
The public appetite for ancient history is 
underdeveloped because of its associa-
tion with Baathist grand narratives 
amongst the older generation, and ignor-
ance amongst the younger. There are few 
opportunities to learn about current re-
search on Iraq’s ancient past, unless one 
has particularly good knowledge of Eng-
lish, French or German and a particularly 
good internet connection. Books in Arabic 
are still in circulation of course, but those 
from the 1960s and later are tainted by 
their political overtones, and those from 
the 1950s and earlier are woefully out of 
date. Museums are not yet set up to offer 
public education, for adults or children, 
assuming that they are open at all. Print 
and broadcast news media are highly 
fragmented and focus primarily on mat-
ters of political interest. Government edu-
cation initiatives are narrowly utilitarian 
and have not yet grasped the potential of 
humanities subjects in general, let alone 
ancient history in particular, in developing 
a strong civil society.
Many governments worldwide are cur-
rently struggling to see the value in sup-
porting academic humanities and social 
sciences, however, not just those like Iraq 
with more immediately pressing con-
cerns. The British Academy has recently 
advocated for “prospering wisely” 
through, in Lord Stern’s words, “concep-
tual clarity and impartial, evidence-based 
research and analysis, together with 
open-mindedness and creativity in ex-
ploring new ideas” which “can guide—and 
promote—reasoned political and public 
discourse, by bringing fresh knowledge 
and ideas to the fore” (British Academy 
2). It is not just about the obvious eco-
nomic benefits to the creative, cultural 
and tourism industries. A particularly 
powerful section argues that “local his-
tory (…) makes us who we are. (…) Iden-
tity and well-being are inexorably linked” 
(13). Perhaps even more pertinent to pres-
ent-day Iraq, “by explaining how narra-
tives of the past created present differ-
ences, historians (…) can help us 
celebrate diversity and not merely toler-
ate the different” (22). As Diarmaid Mac-
Culloch puts it, “particularly in a democ-
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racy, telling the story right is really very 
important, because so many people are 
involved in making decisions, even if it is 
just a vote at an election” (22). Or as Saad 
Eskander, Director of the Iraq National Li-
brary and Archives, said to me in 2013: “If 
we do not know ourselves, who are we 
reconstructing this country for? If we can-
not look back, we have no memory, we 
have no identity and we cannot move for-
ward.” In this light, it is difficult to sustain 
the argument that history has no place in 
any country’s future.
Ancient Iraqi History Now 
Let us turn to the production of ancient 
Babylonian history in Iraq at the present 
time, starting with its most visible symbol, 
the Iraq Museum. 
In retrospect, it is now clear that at least 
some of the looting at the Iraq Museum in 
2003, in particular the ransacking of staff 
offices, was motivated by its close identi-
fication with the previous regime (Polk 
and Schuster; Stone and Bajjaly). There 
was of course also professional as well as 
opportunistic theft of artefacts, but this is 
not the place to dwell on that particular 
episode. Indeed, I would argue that inter-
national concern, even obsession, over 
the fate of particular archaeological ob-
jects stands in stark and shameful contrast 
with the general indifference to the fate of 
Iraqis themselves, both individually and 
institutionally. 
The Iraq Museum and its parent organisa-
tion the State Board of Antiquities and 
Heritage have both suffered major losses 
of senior staff through de-Baathification, 
death, and emigration. Current managers 
and the ministerial staff that oversee them 
are clearly under-trained and out of their 
depth. These factors all have repercus-
sions that are detrimental to the Museum 
itself but—paradoxically—generally benefi-
cial to the provincial structures it nominal-
ly regulates. With rare exceptions the Mu-
seum is still closed to the public and to 
researchers, over a decade since the war 
(Arraf). There is an education officer with 
good English who can give tours, howev-
er. The galleries have been refitted and 
repopulated with objects, some of them 
several times, but the end result is much 
as it was pre-war: large numbers of arte-
facts grouped by type or material into rel-
atively small cases which often seem too 
small for the very large galleries, and very 
little explanatory text or none at all. The 
staff have by and large relied on outside 
agencies for gallery refurbishments, espe-
cially UNESCO, and there is little domestic 
curatorial activity. There is still a palpable 
victim culture—that the museum is still suf-
fering from the war ten years ago, with an 
explicit expectation that foreign agencies, 
governmental and non-governmental, 
should continue to come to its aid. This 
attitude is in stark contrast to the energy 
and entrepreneurialism of other cultural 
heritage organisations across Iraq.
The Iraq Museum, as home of the State 
Board of Antiquities and Heritage, is still 
nominally in control of cultural heritage in 
the country’s eighteen provinces, includ-
ing the three that make up Iraqi Kurdistan. 
In practice, however, its inertia means that 
for the most part local officials are relative-
ly autonomous and free to innovate where 
they have the energy to do so; they almost 
always have the money. As I am focusing 
here on ancient history, I will mention only 
in passing the extremely impressive efforts 
driven by the Shia shrines authorities in 
the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala to 
docu ment the material culture of historical 
Islam; and by the avowedly secular and 
non-sectarian Iraqi National Library and 
Archives in Baghdad to digitise and get 
online all official documentation of the 
twentieth century Iraqi state, torture re-
cords and all. However, both are indicative 
of a new and exciting move to the creation 
of local historical narratives. In Basra, for 
instance, the dilapidated old museum has 
been replaced with a new one in one of 
Saddam Hussein’s former palaces on the 
Shatt al-Arab river. The museum is to be 
funded and managed jointly by the State 
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #03–2014
FoCUs 120
Board and—for the first time—by Basra Pro-
vincial Council, through its Tourism and 
Antiquities Committee. UK charity Friends 
of the Basrah Museum and the British In-
stitute for the Study of Iraq also provide 
assistance (“Friends of Basrah Museum”). 
The final phases of work are now under-
way, and it is hoped that the building will 
open to the public some time in 2015.
A formal operating plan spells out the mu-
seum’s aims, stressing local stories as 
much as national history. Objects for the 
museum will be sent from Baghdad, but 
unusually the choice will be negotiated 
with the local museum director, Qahtan 
Alabeed, and supplemented with locally 
sourced artefacts. The majority of gallery 
space is given to Sumerian and Babylo-
nian (ancient southern Iraqi) history, along 
with that of Basra itself, from ancient times 
to the present day. Assyrian (ancient north-
ern Iraqi) history gets just a single small 
gallery of its own. It has not yet been de-
cided whether the museum will charge an 
entrance fee—a prohibitive $1 for Iraqis has 
been mentioned, $10 for foreigners—or 
will open its doors for free.
Where, in this setup, do new historians, ar-
chaeologists, and cultural heritage experts 
come from? And how do they get trained? 
There are thirty-three state universities in 
Iraq, thirteen of them in Kurdistan, and a 
further twenty-two private ones. All have 
suffered badly from sanctions-era and 
post-war academic emigration, lack of in-
frastructural investment, and training, etc., 
and a top-down bureaucracy (Jawad and 
al-Assaf). The top 15% of school-leavers 
are channelled into studying engineering, 
medicine, and pharmacy. Even my math-
ematician friends complain that they do 
not get the brightest students. The histor-
ians and archaeologists certainly do not. 
Since 2009 there has been a large-scale 
graduate scholarship scheme, funded by 
the Ministry of Higher Education, which 
has supported over 22,000 students to 
date. There is also plethora of similar Eu-
ropean and US schemes for Iraqi graduate 
students—in March 2013 ICEF estimated 
that they amount to about $200 million—
but the majority of those understandably 
go to students in science, technology, en-
gineering and medicine. Most (but not all) 
of the state universities have archaeology, 
ancient history and/or cultural heritage 
departments, but I know of no systematic 
survey of them. 
I have personally visited the archaeology 
departments of Qadissiyah University in 
Diwaniyah and Kufa University in Najaf. At 
Qadissiyah, the archaeology department 
is not connected to the internet. The head 
of department has a laptop and there are 
at least two classrooms with digital project-
ors but only one of them is functional. 
Technological infrastructure in the much 
better-funded Kufa University is signifi-
cantly better. Library provision at both in-
stitutions, however, is woeful: budgets are 
tiny, and the students’ language skills do 
not extend to reading European text-
books. Even having good skills in conver-
sational Business English does not equip 
one to read highly technical excavation 
reports, or the rebarbative musings of an 
erudite Assyriologist. And Iraqi students 
are simply not trained in the search and 
analytical skills needed to locate and make 
sense of what is on the web. Well-meaning 
projects to mass-scan archaeological re-
ports to PDF and to negotiate free access 
to JSTOR for Iraqi universities are there-
fore largely ineffective. However, all staff 
and students have phones or tablets—all 
graduands from the University of Kufa are 
presented with smartphones by the pro-
vincial governor—and everyone is on so-
cial media of some sort or another.
The University of Kufa runs training exca-
vations at the early Islamic city there, while 
their counterparts at Qadissiyah have had 
digs in recent years at the Old Babylonian 
cities of Marad and Pi-Kasi (known locally 
as Abu Antik because of the wealth of an-
cient artefacts found there). Qadissiyah 
Assyriologist Saad Salman Sinaa is editing 
cuneiform tablets found at the latter site. 
Up at the University of Mosul (which I have 
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not myself visited) the archaeology de-
partment has been working with a team 
from Boston University, headed by Profes-
sor Michael Danti, to reform its curricu-
lum, in a project funded by the US Em-
bassy in Iraq.
Since 2013 young Iraqi archaeologists are 
also being trained at the British-Iraqi exca-
vations at Tell Khaiber in Dhi Qar province. 
Dhi Qar University has no archaeology de-
partment; the trainees, all university grad-
uates, come from the provincial office of 
the State Board of Antiquities and Heri-
tage, along with senior archaeologist Ali 
Khadem whose primary responsibility is 
the enormous site of Ur. It is hoped to ex-
tend the training programme significantly 
in future seasons, funding permitting.
Conclusions: Possible Futures, Enabling 
Change
The nation state of Iraq is extraordinarily 
resilient, despite its obvious major flaws—
or even because of them, as Fanar Had-
dad has recently argued. Whatever Iraq’s 
fate as a political entity, there are thirty-
three million-odd people living there. 
They, like everyone, deserve the right to 
learn about their region’s past, both recent 
and ancient, should they choose to do so, 
to understand who they and their commu-
nities are, and how they came to be. There 
is great potential to enable that to happen, 
not least because current stasis in central 
government is allowing local identities to 
flourish as never before since the 1950s. 
The worry is that, at worst, the old central-
ised Baathist historical narrative will be re-
placed by competing sectarian accounts, 
which are just as limiting, biased and off-
putting as the one they replace.
Where do outside experts fit in? Do we 
have any role in changing the current pic-
ture, given that our collective efforts over 
the past decade have largely failed to be 
transformative? Westerners certainly 
should not be dictating terms to our Iraqi 
colleagues but equally we should not con-
tinue to ignore them. Equally, business as 
usual will not be good enough. Digitising 
materials is pointless without finding aids 
and further support. Out-of-country train-
ing for limited numbers of people is like-
wise often suboptimal: once they are back 
in their home institution, experience 
shows that they struggle to implement 
what they have learned without the re-
sources, infrastructure and managerial 
support that we take for granted. I see 
three basic prerequisites for the collabora-
tive development of a viable professional 
infrastructure.
1. Arabic Language 
We need to learn to speak it, and write it, 
in such a way as will make sense to Iraqi 
audiences—professional or public—and 
enable them to engage and respond. We 
do not expect our undergraduates, let 
alone our public audiences, to know any 
foreign languages, so why should that be 
a prerequisite in Iraq? Of course it is ne-
cessary at graduate level but certainly not 
before. That might mean in the first in-
stance pushing our publishers to commis-
sion Arabic translations of our books. But 
it also means being able to speak face-to-
face with colleagues, students, and school 
groups in their own language. Over the 
past few months the Open Richly Anno-
tated Cuneiform Corpus collective (Oracc) 
has been developing mobile-friendly de-
sign for its educational sites such as Knowl-
edge and Power in the Neo-Assyrian Em-
pire, Ancient Mesopotamian Gods and 
Goddesses, and Cuneiform Revealed. The 
next step, funding permitting, will be 
Arab ic translation, cultural adaptation, and 
focused training for Arabophone users 
and content creators.
2. Scoping the Landscape in Iraq
There is no shortage of energetic, intelli-
gent, frustrated academics in Iraqi univer-
sities and cultural heritage organisations 
who are desperate for international col-
laboration, and the innovation and inspira-
tion that collaboration brings. Identifying 
them and discussing their needs seems a 
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key first step, while ensuring that our own 
academic needs and principles are met. 
The partners we work with need not just 
be academics and university students. In-
country NGOs can help develop public 
education programmes. UNESCO Iraq 
needs to be encouraged to connect its 
education and culture strategies more co-
herently. Government ministries—whether 
Education, Higher Education, Culture, 
Tourism and Antiquities—print and broad-
cast media, commercial and industrial 
sports: all are potential allies. 
3. Advocating Internationally
Many of us need to commit to this future. 
A handful of individuals, or even a handful 
of organisations, cannot work with every 
prospective Iraqi partner. Equally, a huge 
public relations exercise will be necessary, 
to persuade colleagues, managers and 
funders of the safety and value of working 
in-country, with the right partners and un-
der the right conditions. In particular, it is 
important to get the message across that 
sustained engagement with Iraq’s ancient 
history is not merely a western indulgence. 
Iraq’s past matters deeply to many Iraqis, 
for whom it is a powerful and effective 
means of asserting collective identity, and 
celebrating cultural diversity, in these 
most destructive and divisive of times. 
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especially since ISIS’ invasion 
of the Mosul region in June 
2014, as updates become 
outdated almost as soon 
as they are written at the 
moment.
Notes 
1 This paper is a revised 
version of a talk given to the 
Institute for Classical Studies’ 
Ancient History Seminar in 
London in May 2013, at the 
kind invitation of Amélie 
Kuhrt, under the title “Publics, 
Practitioners, and Politics: 
Talking Babylonian History 
in Southern Iraq.” I wrote it in 
the context of formulating the 
next five-year plan and case 
for support for the British 
Institute for the Study of Iraq, 
whose governing council of 
trustees I currently chair, and 
submitted it for review in the 
spring of 2014. In revisions 
(autumn 2014) I have not 
attempted to take account of 
the ever-changing political 
and military situation in Iraq, 
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